As of March 20, 2025, the Philippines has formally invited India to join the “Squad,” an informal security grouping comprising the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, to enhance maritime security in the South China Sea. This call, articulated by General Romeo S. Brawner Jr., Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, during the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi on March 19, 2025, reflects Manila’s growing alarm over China’s assertive actions in the region. The proposal to expand the Squad to include India—and potentially South Korea—underscores a strategic pivot aimed at countering Beijing’s dominance in this critical maritime domain. Below is a detailed analysis of this development, its motivations, and its implications.
Background: The South China Sea Crisis
The South China Sea, a vital global trade route handling over $3 trillion in annual commerce, has become a flashpoint due to China’s expansive territorial claims. Beijing asserts sovereignty over nearly 90% of the sea through its “nine-dash line,” a claim rejected by a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in favor of the Philippines. Despite this, China has militarized artificial islands—such as Mischief Reef, featuring a 2.7-km runway, air defenses, and missile systems—intensified its coast guard presence, and employed “grey zone” tactics like water cannons and vessel ramming against Philippine ships. These actions threaten Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including the resource-rich Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines maintains a grounded naval vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre.
The Philippines, with limited military capacity, has sought international partnerships to bolster its deterrence. The Squad, formed in 2023 as an offshoot of the broader Quad (U.S., India, Japan, Australia), has conducted joint maritime exercises in Philippine waters since April 2024, focusing on interoperability, intelligence sharing, and countering China’s aggression. However, escalating confrontations with Beijing have prompted Manila to seek additional allies, with India emerging as a key prospect.
Why the Philippines Wants India in the Squad
General Brawner’s invitation to India reflects several strategic imperatives:
- Shared Threat Perception:
- Brawner explicitly labeled China a “common enemy” during his Raisina Dialogue remarks, citing its “illegal, coercive, and disruptive” tactics. India shares this concern, having faced Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, notably the 2020 Galwan clash. Both nations also contend with China’s maritime assertiveness—India in the Indian Ocean and the Philippines in the South China Sea—making their interests convergent.
- India’s Naval Prowess:
- India boasts a formidable navy, with aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines, and has expanded its presence in the Indo-Pacific under its Act East Policy. Its delivery of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines in April 2024—the first such export—demonstrates its capacity to enhance Manila’s defense capabilities. Joining the Squad could see India deploy naval assets to the South China Sea, amplifying the group’s deterrence.
- Expanding the Squad’s Reach:
- The current Squad—U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines—is geographically focused on the western Pacific. India’s inclusion would bridge the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, creating a more cohesive Indo-Pacific security architecture. This aligns with Manila’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC), launched in 2024, to protect its entire EEZ.
- Countering China’s Isolation Strategy:
- China has sought to isolate the Philippines diplomatically, rejecting multilateral frameworks like UNCLOS. By inviting India, Manila aims to internationalize the dispute, leveraging India’s stature as a rising power and its alignment with a rules-based order to challenge Beijing’s unilateralism.
- Existing Bilateral Momentum:
- India-Philippines ties have deepened recently, marked by the inaugural Maritime Dialogue in Manila in December 2024, joint naval exercises, and agreements on coast guard cooperation. Brawner noted an existing “partnership with the Indian military and defense industry,” providing a foundation for Squad membership.
The Squad: Structure and Evolution
The Squad emerged as a tactical, security-focused grouping distinct from the Quad, which operates at a broader strategic level across the Indo-Pacific. Initiated in June 2023 with a meeting of defense chiefs in Singapore, followed by joint exercises in 2024, the Squad emphasizes practical military collaboration:
- Members: U.S., Japan, Australia, Philippines.
- Activities: Joint patrols, drills, intelligence sharing, and capacity building in the South China Sea.
- Nickname: Coined by Pentagon officials, reflecting its tight-knit, action-oriented nature.
Unlike the Quad, where India’s strategic autonomy limits its military commitments, the Squad’s members—all U.S. treaty allies except India—share a unified security vision. Brawner’s proposal to include India and South Korea, discussed with India’s Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan on March 19, aims to broaden this coalition, though no official response from New Delhi has been confirmed as of March 20.
India’s Potential Role and Considerations
If India joins the Squad, its contributions could be transformative:
- Maritime Presence: Deploying warships for joint patrols, as it did in ASEAN exercises in 2023, would signal a stronger stance against China.
- Defense Exports: Expanding arms sales, like BrahMos, or offering helicopters (pledged in 2023) would bolster Philippine capabilities.
- Strategic Messaging: India’s vocal support for UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling, evident in recent joint statements with the Philippines, would reinforce the Squad’s legal stance.
However, India faces dilemmas:
- Strategic Autonomy: Historically non-aligned, India avoids formal military alliances, preferring flexibility in its multi-alignment policy. Joining the Squad could strain relations with China, already tense post-Galwan.
- Focus on Indian Ocean: New Delhi prioritizes its own maritime backyard, where China’s presence (e.g., Djibouti base, port investments) is growing, over distant South China Sea commitments.
- Quad Dynamics: India’s role in the Quad might overlap with the Squad, raising questions about resource allocation and diplomatic bandwidth.
Implications for Regional Security
India’s potential entry into the Squad could reshape Indo-Pacific dynamics:
- Strengthened Deterrence: A six-nation Squad (with South Korea) would present a formidable counterweight to China’s navy, the world’s largest, enhancing freedom of navigation and EEZ security.
- Pressure on China: Beijing, which dismissed Philippine actions as externally scripted (per Foreign Minister Wang Yi, March 7, 2025), might face greater multilateral resistance, complicating its South China Sea strategy.
- Philippine Leverage: Manila gains diplomatic and military clout, reducing its reliance on the U.S. and diversifying partnerships.
- India’s Indo-Pacific Role: Joining would elevate India’s status as a net security provider, aligning with its Act East Policy and ambitions to rival China’s regional influence.
Challenges and China’s Response
Challenges include:
- China’s Retaliation: Beijing could escalate grey-zone tactics or pressure India economically, as it did post-Galwan with trade curbs.
- Coordination: Integrating India and South Korea into the Squad requires aligning diverse military systems and strategic priorities.
- Philippine Capacity: Manila’s nascent military modernization needs sustained support to match Squad’s expectations.
China has already reacted sharply, with state media like Global Times framing the Squad’s expansion as a U.S.-led containment plot. Further moves by India could prompt heightened naval activity or diplomatic pushback from Beijing.
Conclusion
The Philippines’ invitation for India to join the Squad, voiced on March 19, 2025, reflects a strategic bid to bolster security in the South China Sea amid China’s unrelenting assertiveness. For Manila, India’s naval strength, defense capabilities, and shared concerns make it an ideal partner to expand the Squad’s reach and efficacy. For India, the decision hinges on balancing its Indo-Pacific ambitions with strategic autonomy, a choice that could redefine its role in countering China. As of March 20, 2025, with General Brawner’s talks with General Chauhan concluded but outcomes unclear, the world watches whether New Delhi will take this leap—potentially transforming the Squad into a six-nation bulwark against Beijing’s maritime ambitions.
